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Of the World Trade Court’s Burden
Sungjoon Cho♠

“We are not final because we
are infallible; but we are
infallible only because we are
final.”1
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Introduction
Ever since the historic launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its
dispute resolution tribunal, the World Trade Court (the Court),2 has commanded both
attention and admiration from its users and commentators. This crown jewel of the WTO
system has attracted over 350 cases in the past decade.3 The Court has addressed three
times more cases than the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has done during the latter’s
half-century of existence.4
Ironically, however, the Court’s magnetism has been a mixed blessing. In addition
to conventional trade issues, such as tariffs and subsidies, it has also attracted high profile
cases characterized by scientific controversies and socio-cultural sensitivities. The Court’s
decisions on these sensitive cases have often caused resentment from some groups,
besides losing parties. For example, the Court’s Hormones decision in 1998, which struck
down the European Union (EU)’s ban on the importation of hormone-treated beef from
the United States on the ground that the ban was adopted with no scientific evidence,5
irked many governments and consumer organizations which accused the Court of forcing
them to accept low regulatory standards in the name of science.6 Four years later, the EU
resurrected the same ban under a new scientific justification.7
Beneath this disapproval of the Court lies an image of a Dworkinian Hercules
which capriciously renders its own answers on risks and science.8 In judging which party
should win the case, this Hercules assesses parties’ arguments and evidence on risks and
regulatory responses through a technical rule labeled the “burden of proof” (BOP). In the
traditional approach used under public international law, the BOP is mainly the parties’
burden: any party which invokes a certain fact bears the burden of proving its veracity

2

In this Article, I use “World Trade Court” or “Court” only in a metaphoric sense. Technically,
the WTO tribunal, i.e., a panel or the Appellate Body, is not a court per se and its decision constitutes a
“recommendation” to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), art. 19. Nonetheless, it is still a “judicial” or at least “quasi-judicial” organ which
performs an adjudicative function.
3
World Trade Organization List of Disputed Cases,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
4
List of Cases Brought Before the International Court of Justice, http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
5
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶197, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
6
DEBI BARKER & JERRY MANDER, INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
GLOBAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM? 26 (1999).
7
See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22. ARIZ J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 114
(2005).
8
See generally RONALD DOWRKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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(actori incumbit probation9). This position was affirmed in an early WTO case, Shirts and
Blouses.10 Therefore, for strategic reasons, parties have been preoccupied with the
allocation of the BOP. A complaining party tends to argue that a defending (regulating)
party’s regulation can be invoked only as an “exception” to a contrary obligation so that
the latter should prove necessary facts for the exception. On the other hand, the
defending party tends to argue that it has a “right” to regulate in the first place so that the
former should prove conflicting facts which may rebut this presumption.
However, how Hercules weaves its own (right) answers on risks and science, and
who it will pick in the end as a winner is related only remotely to the BOP as defined as
the parties’ burden, i.e., the allocation of the BOP (who to prove). No matter how hard a
party attempts to strategize this aspect of the BOP in the proceeding, it is the Court
which determines such allocation via interpretation. Furthermore, even if who to prove is
determined, the final outcome of the case hinges eventually on those elements which the
Court requires parties to prove (what to prove) as well as whether the Court approves that
a party has discharged its BOP and allows the burden to shift to the other party (whether
to prove). Therefore, the BOP is in fact the Court’s hermeneutical burden.
Then, what has been the rationale, or a driving force, behind the Court’s
interpretive stance on these BOP issues, such as who to prove, what to prove and whether
to prove, in those disputes regarding risks and regulation? This Article argues that it has
been a “judicialization of science”: the Court, with its judicial authority, employs the BOP
in a way which defines and constructs its own version of science11 to deliver a definite
answer to litigants. Yet, as long as the Court plays the role of Hercules by handing down
actuarial justice on issues of high controversy, such as risks and science, whatever
decision it makes will hardly satisfy the parties concerned, at least the losing party, and
thus never fully resolving their disputes. This dichotomy between the Court’s
transcendental judgment and parties’ obsession with their own versions of science is a
fundamental factor which threatens both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court.
Parties, and observers, will neither respect nor fully implement such decisions.
Against this depressing backdrop, this Article explores a new hermeneutical path
by which the Court can avoid this potential legitimacy crisis. If the Court’s own answer
(substantive justice) cannot put an end to parties’ antimonial struggle, the Court should
contemplate guiding parties to discover the solution between them via constructive
regulatory dialogue. In other words, the Court, instead of throwing out its own “right
answer” in front of already dogmatic parties, might encourage them to fulfill their
dialectical dialogue through talking to, deliberating with, and enlightening each other.
This nuanced judicial posture can greatly mitigate any unnecessary adversarial tensions,
9

See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 327, 334 (1953); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 15-16 (June 15).
10
Appellate Body Report, US-Wool Shirts and Blouses from United States-Measures Affecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India India, 15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997).
11
In this Article, the notion of science is a broad one, including not only natural science but also
social science, such as public policy, sociology, psychology, and economics.
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which will in turn secure a certain space for accommodation or recognition of different
regulatory positions.12
The Court can achieve this new goal by transforming its current substantive
hermeneutics over the BOP into a “procedural” one. The Court can lead parties to
present different probative evidence, i.e., evidence substantiating the procedural integrity
of a measure, from the conventional one, i.e., evidence adduced to prove that it is
scientifically valid. For example, if a defending (regulating) party has failed to respond to
a complaining (exporting) party’s inquiries on the former’s new health regulation which is
negatively affecting the latter’s exports, the Court may establish a presumption against
the former that its measure was adopted without valid scientific justification. This
jurisprudence will motivate the former to engage with the latter in good faith to avoid any
adverse inferences.
A procedural turn by the Court would, in a sense, be redemptive to disputants
because it would engage them in a dialectical bond of regulatory discourse and thus
immunize them from any zero-sum ruling, which would widen their initial antimonial
stance, rather than narrowing it.13 In this procedural approach, a Court’s decision on risk
regulations14 is inherently provisional. Even after the decision, parties may still be able to
reach a compromise as they naturally engage in further regulatory dialogue as the losing
party complies with such procedural decisions whose remedies are also procedural.
Critically, the Court does not provide any “final normative standpoint.”15 Instead, it de
facto remands the original case to parties with nuanced instructions to communicate with
each other in an attempt to overcome their own socio-cultural prejudices on risks and
regulation.16 This hermeneutical turn to a procedural discipline in fact corresponds with
the original normative orientation of those rules which govern risk regulations, i.e.,
12

In this context, Gaskin observed that “[t]he strategic power of polarized argumentation will
always deliver short-term benefits to successful advocates, thereby strengthening popular reliance on
transcendental reasoning. Over the longer term, however, dialectical reasoning offers everyone a less
divisive accommodation with arguments-from-ignorance by limiting their authority to restricted domains
within a broader conceptual horizon.” GASKIN, supra note_, at 240.
13
“Rather than bringing conflicts to a peaceful result, contemporary tribunals appear to sharpen
existing divisions, even as jurisprudential authority descends from its transcendental abode and shapes the
everyday world according to the demands of litigation.” GASKIN, supra note_, at 208.
14
This article focuses on risk regulations under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
Article XX (General Exceptions), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure (SPS) which require governments to assess, determine and manage
those risk-related regulatory challenges. Those regulations vary in accordance with different types of
societal risks, including human health risks and other risks from illicit practices, such as smuggling and tax
evasion. Those risk regulations somehow involve scientific investigations in that regulators weigh in risks
and effectiveness of policy options by means of objective disciplines, such as toxicology, medical science,
engineering, economics, and public health studies. Finally, a disclaimer: this article addresses the BOP
issues related to risk-related regulations in the areas of health, safety, environment, and other public policies.
It does not deal with the BOP issues in other areas, such as antidumping law, which have a quite different
set of rules and jurisprudence.
15
GASKIN, supra note_, at 242.
16
GASKIN, supra note_, at 264.
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GATT Article XX and the SPS Agreement. The preambular language (chapeau) of
GATT Article XX focuses on the manner in which a measure is applied. Also, obligations
under the SPS Agreement, such as the risk assessment requirement, focus more on
regulatory procedures than on substantive, specific levels of protection.17
This Article unfolds in the following sequence: Part I launches the analysis by
observing that the conventional notion of the BOP in international trade law is the
parties’ burden. Which one should prove disputed facts has been a subject of serious
arguments by parties, which have regarded this issue as a determinative factor to the
outcome of their cases. In contrast, Part II shifts the focus from parties to the Court and
attempts to conceptualize the BOP as the Court’s hermeneutical burden under which the
Court must determine who to prove, what to prove and whether to prove before it finally
picks the winner in each case. Part III then unearths the Court’s veiled agenda beneath
the current exercise of its burden. It defines the agenda as “judicialization of science” and
argues that the Court plays the role of a Hercules who delivers right answers once and for
all on controversial risk-related disputes under its judicial authority. Part IV criticizes this
substantive finality which the Court pursues: it not only precipitates jurisprudential
incoherencies but also eventually undermines the Court’s legitimacy. As a solution, Part
V suggests that the Court should interpretively reconstruct relevant provisions from a
procedural standpoint, and thus motivate parties to engage in regulatory dialogue and
cooperation. It concludes that the Court should articulately speak to parties through this
new hermeneutics.

I. Parties’ Burden: The Conventional Approach on the Burden of Proof
in International Trade Law
The panel practice under the GATT centers on the assignment issue (who to
prove) in administering the BOP.18 Under the GATT system, panels developed a BOP
doctrine despite the lack of any textual ground.19 Under this doctrine, a complaining
party must demonstrate that a defending party had violated certain provisions of the
Agreement.20 Also, a party invoking an exception bears the burden of proving that it had

17

David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An
Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 925-26 (2000).
18
See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36. VA. J. INT’ L. 379, 434 n.318 (1996) (viewing that
“burden of proof is used in the sense of assigning which party is responsible for proving or disproving a
proposition rather than in the sense of what ‘degree of proof’ that party is required to satisfy”). But see Vern
R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty,
Science Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 290-96 (1998)
(distinguishing between the issue of allocation of proof burdens and standard of proof).
19
Nichols, supra note _, at 434.
20
See e.g., Canada/Japan--Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, 36 Supp.
BISD 167, 198 (1989). See also Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
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met all the requirements of that exception.21 Philip Nichols observed that GATT panels
took this assignment of the proof burdens on exceptions so seriously that “changing it
would be tantamount to renegotiating the obligations and benefits of the Contracting
Parties.”22 In articulating the doctrine, GATT panels highlighted that it must be parties’,
not the panel’s, task to demonstrate and prove their arguments and positions.23
The WTO inherited from GATT this conventional approach on the BOP which
highlights the allocation of the initial burden of proof, i.e., who bears the proof burdens in
the first place.24 The AB in Shirts and Blouses delivered a paradigmatic ruling in this issue.
The AB held that:
[I]t is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law
and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the
party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a
particular claim or defense. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to
raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to
the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption.25
This finding has frequently been cited ever since in subsequent cases involving the
BOP issues.26 The WTC often begins its ruling on the BOP by referring to the finding.

GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1420-21 (1994) (noting that
the explicit terms of GATT Article XX requires defendant governments to raise justification).
21
See e.g., United States--Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 39 Supp. BISD 206, 282
(1992); Canada--Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, 36 Supp. BISD 68, 84 (1989); Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 30 Supp. BISD 140, 164 (1984).
22
Nichols, supra note _, at 435.
23
Nichols, supra note _, at 434; See EEC--Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, 30 Supp. BISD 129, 138 (1983).
24
See Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195,
1248 (1998) (regarding the burden of proof issue as whether a complaining party always bears the burden of
proof in the WTO dispute proceeding or whether such burden may shift to a defending party under certain
conditions).
25
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India, pt. IV, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997). Some commentators distinguish between an initial
allocation of BOP (global BOP) and a shifted one (local BOP). Regarding views that the BOP is never
shifted, see Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof, and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the
Burden?, , 252-53 (1998) (hereinafter Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion) (viewing that a
complainant’s duty to establish a prima facie case subject to a subsequent rebut by a defendant does not
regard the burden of proof but the evaluation of evidence and therefore the initial allocation of burden is
never shifted); Walker, supra note _, at 295 (arguing that against the burden of persuasion is never shifted
onto the defending party, even after the complainant has made its prima facie case).
26
See e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), ¶40, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European CommunitiesTrade Description of Sardines, ¶27, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
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Such habitual citation by subsequent tribunals conferred the finding a certain aura of
authority and thus established an observable jurisprudence in this area.
Then why have parties taken the initial allocation of the BOP so seriously? One
might reasonably speculate that an initial allocation of proof burdens would eventually
determine the outcome of a case since it reflects a normative configuration of treaty
obligation, e.g., whether a provision offers an independent right or a mere exception,
between a regulating party and the other affected party.27 Therefore, a complaining party,
like India in Shirts and Blouses, would resist bearing the burden of proving that a
defending party, the United States in this case, has violated WTO norms in the first place,
but rather prefer to have the defending party bear the burden of proving that the latter’s
measure could be justified as an exception to certain general obligations.
Treaty texts tend to play an initial, albeit provisional, key role in this normative
configuration between parties. By specifying rights and obligations of parties, treaty texts
establish various “presumptions” on one side and in turn require the other side to
overturn (refute) such presumptions by proving the opposite facts. For this reason, an
initial allocation of BOP is tantamount to declaring an opening position which may be
advantageous to one party vis-à-vis the other. Moreover, if an initial burden of proof
borne by one party, be it a complaining party or a defending party, is so heavy that the
party is likely to fail to discharge its proof burden, such allocation of BOP tends to decide
the outcome of a case. Thus, in an adversarial battle of litigation, this original position
may be “prominent,” in particular when a dispute involves complicated factual aspects
such as risks and science.28
For example, the Cartagena Protocol is said to create a presumption of danger and
thus shift the burden of proving that living modified organisms (LMOs) are safe to an
innovator (exporter).29 Thus, an importing country, i.e., a regulating country, holds a
right to regulate over the importation of the LMOs. Under this normative configuration,
an importing (regulating) country’s measure will always prevail, if an exporting country’s
burden to prove its LMOs’ safety is insurmountable. Likewise, the SPS Agreement
arguably establishes a presumption that a WTO member has a right to set its own
appropriate level of sanitary protection, even though such level departs from international
standards. As a result, the other party (exporting country) would have to bear the burden
27

Cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burden of Quality: The Burden of Proof and Presumption in Indian
and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 92 (1999) (observing that certain modern Indian laws
attempted to employ presumptions and burdens of proof as a “tool for countering the traditional normative
system’s resistance to the implementation of the new legal regime”).
28
Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in
the First Three SPS Disputes, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 641, 659 (1999).
29
Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 29 Jan 2000, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 (June 29, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp; Doaa
Abdel Motaal, Is the World Trade Organization Anti-Precaution?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 489-90 (2005).
See also Paulette Stenzel, Why and How the World Trade Organization Must Promote Environmental Protection,
13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 44 (2002) (contending that the WTO should espouse the precautionary
principle and thus impose the burden of proof on manufacturers to demonstrate the safety of a product).
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of proving that the importing country’s measure is without scientific justification.
However, under the GATT structure, the importing country, not the exporting country,
should demonstrate as an exception that such regulation is necessary to protect human
health since GATT is premised on free trade obligations by members, not on their rights
to regulate.30

II. The World Trade Court’s Burden: Reconstructing the Burden of
Proof in International Trade Law
A. From Parties’ Burden to the Court’s Burden
As discussed above, the conventional BOP rule under the GATT/WTO
jurisprudence imposes an initial BOP on a party invoking certain facts and arguments in
its favor. In most cases, the BOP is borne to a complaining party which should
demonstrate, or establish a prima facie case, that a defending party has violated
GATT/WTO rules. As for exceptions or affirmative defenses, a defending party bears the
burden of proving that its measure, although provisionally WTO-inconsistent,
nevertheless falls within the rubric of one of the exceptions and thus eventually WTOconsistent. Therefore, under the conventional approach, the BOP denotes parties’ burden.
Accordingly, in any adversarial form of adjudication, including the WTO dispute
settlement system, the issue of the initial allocation of the BOP appears a momentous
matter at first glance. Theoretically, if there was insufficient evidence which substantiates
neither party’s position or if both parties’ evidence is in a state of equipoise in their
probative force, the BOP, like a tie-breaker, decides who should win.31 In other words, the
BOP may stand for a risk of non-persuasion. In addition, a party which bears the BOP
should invest in a substantial amount of time and effort in adducing relevant and
necessary evidence in the first place. This initiation cost may be disadvantageous in a
strategic sense under an adversarial proceeding.
Under these circumstances, the BOP may be prone to abuse and manipulation.
Parties may be tempted to craft their claims in a way that would evade those issues as to
which they would not desire to bear the proof burden and force the opposing party to
raise and prove those facts.32 One commentator observed that there is a “genuine risk”
30

See e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 22-23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting
Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14-15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997); Panel Report,
United States–Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶5.27, WT/DS186/R (Jan. 12, 2000).
31
Michael Lennard, Navigating the Stars: Interpreting WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 17, 84
(2002)
32
Michelle T. Grando, Allocating Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 615, 629
(2006).
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that parties do nothing in the proceedings but claim that the other party should persuade
the panel.33
On the other hand, however, it is eventually the Court which decides who should
win. The initial allocation of the BOP (who to prove) alone seldom decides the outcome
of a case. This issue may be of great importance under the common law system where
judicial interventions are seriously curtailed by the existence of jury and litigant
autonomy, even in case of evidential incompleteness.34 Yet, its relative significance tends
to wane in international tribunals since these tribunals hold a wider range of discretion in
the proceeding and emphasize a collective obligation by parties to cooperate with each
other in presenting evidence before the tribunals.35 The WTC is no exception to this
trend in that it enjoys wide discretion in fact-finding, including the authority to summon
expert witnesses.36
As an ostensible departure from the law and economic analysis, the BOP rule
under the WTO system does not reflect “respective difficulties that may possibly be
encountered by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a
case.”37 Instead, winning or losing a case hinges critically on how the Court itself
interprets both facts and law in proof-related areas, i.e., whether to prove and what to
prove. It is the Court which weighs each evidence and determines whether and how
much a party has proved to discharge its BOP as well as when to shift the proof burden to
the other party. The Court enjoys “a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the
evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence.”38 This discretion is immune
from an appeal.39 The Court may even consider the expert opinions to determine whether
33
34

Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at 228-29.
See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 621, 640

(1998).
35

Grando, supra note_, at 616 n.2.. See also MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED
ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 119 (1996); “It is often said that the
idea of peaceful settlement of disputes before international tribunals is largely based on the premise of
cooperation of the litigating parties.” Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note_, at 234 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel, and Other Items,
¶6.40, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997)). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World
Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995–2003 499, 511(Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2004) (observing that the issue of the burden of proof has seldom been raised in the
European Court of Justice).
36
But see Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe’s Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs-The
Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 317, 346 (2000) (arguing
that a panel’s use of expert witnesses in the WTO proceeding should be limited to convincing themselves of
an already proved prima facie case, but not be extended to substantiating such facts as were not presented by
parties).
37
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶281,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
38
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos, ¶161, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
39
Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, ¶261,
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (“The Panel's consideration and weighing of the evidence in support of
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a prima facie case has been established.40 Likewise, it is the Court which decides what
should be proved, i.e., the question of “what the importing Member must demonstrate.”41
For example, in Gambling both the defendant (the United States) and the
complainant (Antigua) appealed on the ground that the panel erred in its treatment of
BOP under GATS Article XIV (General Exceptions). Interestingly, both the U.S. and
Antigua argued that the panel, in deciding whether the United States’ ban on the online
gambling was an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” failed to base its ruling on the
other party’s arguments and evidence adduced in terms of Article XIV, but instead
“recycled” previous arguments and evidence submitted by both parties under different
provisions.42
To each party this recycling by the panel is improper since it unduly advantaged
the other party. Antigua viewed that the recycling permitted the United States to
discharge the latter’s initial burden of making a prima facie case under the exception
clause (Article XIV) when the latter failed to do so.43 On the other hand, the United
States submitted that the same practice (recycling) “constructed a rebuttal” under the
chapeau (arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination) in favor of Antigua when Antigua
failed to do so.44 However, the Appellate Body (AB) endorsed the panel’s discretion to
reuse those arguments and evidence previously adduced under different yet still relevant
provisions.45 This overarching evidentiary rule, although it may contribute to judicial
economy, tends to override the initial allocation of BOP by allowing the panel to
effectively relieve a certain party of its BOP.
I am not arguing here that the initial allocation of burden of proof (who to prove)
is inconsequential. It is still important. As Henrik Horn and Joseph Weiler aptly observed,
it will “ceteris paribus affect the probability that the different parties win” by burdening one
party over the other.46 Likewise, it will shape Members’ behavior in various ways,
including their resource spending in the proceeding as well as decision-making as to
whether to launch litigation at all and/or when to settle.47 Nonetheless, such determinant
power of the allocation of BOP tends to dramatically decrease if the very “ceteris paribus”
(other things being equal) condition is not met. In other words, if the Court destabilizes
Canada's claims relates to its assessment of the facts and, therefore, falls outside the scope of appellate
review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.”)
40
Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on the Imports of Agriculture, Textile, and
Industrial Products, ¶142, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999).
41
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India, 14-15, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997)
42
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling , ¶¶
277-79, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
43
Id. at ¶278.
44
Id. at ¶279.
45
Id. at ¶¶ 287-88.
46
Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines:
Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002 262 (H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis eds. 2005).
47
Id.
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this unique condition by setting the subsequent terms of parties’ evidentiary tasks, i.e.,
whether to prove and what to prove, the initial allocation (locus) of BOP, i.e., who to
prove, may not matter much after all.
For example, in Hormones, even if the AB viewed that “the Panel mistakenly
required that the European Communities take on the burden of proof that its measures
related to the hormones involved here, except MGA, are based on a risk assessment,” and
therefore determined that “the United States and Canada have to make a prima facie
case that these measures are not based on a risk assessment,” the AB still found that “the
United States and Canada, although not required to do so by the Panel, did, in fact, make
this prima facie case that the SPS measures related to the hormones involved here, except
MGA, are not based on a risk assessment.”48
More saliently, the AB in Sardines addressed the effectiveness and appropriateness
of an international standard (Codex Stan 94) on the labeling of Sardines under the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).49 The EC’s Regulation monopolized
the use of term “Sardine” in favor of those sardines caught in the European sea in the
name of consumer protection, while the Codex standard explicitly endorsed a much more
liberal, generic use of the term. Therefore, the labeling of Peruvian Sardines was
prohibited by the EC Regulation, which departed from the Codex Stan 94 permitting
such labeling. Article 2.4 of TBT requires Members to follow a relevant international
standard unless it is ineffective and inappropriate in achieving putative regulatory goals.
Who should then bear the initial burden of proving that the Codex standard is still
ineffective and inappropriate?
The Panel viewed that the defendant (the EC) should, while the AB viewed that
it should rest on the complainant (Peru). The AB, in tandem with its similar ruling in
Hormones, emphasized that Members enjoy regulatory autonomy which would include
even a right to disregard a relevant international standard if it believes that such standard
is ineffective and inappropriate. Therefore, according to the AB, Peru should have proved
that Codex Stan 94 was in fact effective and appropriate to fulfill the EC’s regulatory
goals. At first blush, Peru’s BOP seems quite heavy since it should produce positive
(apodeicdic) evidence which would substantiate that Codex Stan 94 could fully address
European consumers’ concerns for fraud and confusion over sardines.
Nonetheless, the AB declared that Peru did discharge its apparently formidable
BOP by applying rather light evidentiary criteria. Both the panel and the AB endorsed
Peru’s negative (apagogical) evidence which illustrated that “it has not been established”
that most European consumers “have always associated the common name ‘sardines’

48

Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶197 n.180, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
49
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶284-91,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
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exclusively with Sardina pilchardus” which are those sardines harvested in the European
sea and thus familiar to European consumers.50
This type of evidence seems quite insufficient to discharge Peru’s seemingly heavy
BOP since there could still be some confused European consumers out there and the EC
might pursue a zero-tolerance policy over consumer protection, as it did in Hormones.51 In
other words, the AB’s hermeneutics on this low evidentiary threshold in proving whether
an international standard is efficient or appropriate amounts to a second-guessing of
Members’ level of regulatory protection. The AB insinuated that given the regulatory
environment in which to its belief no significant level of risks from consumer confusion
over sardines existed, the Codex Stan 94 would be good enough after all. This posture
runs in the face of the AB’s previous allocation of BOP in favor of Members’ regulatory
autonomy, which led Peru, not the EC, to prove the value of Codex Stan 94. Accordingly,
the AB’s reversal of the panel’s allocation of BOP (who to prove) from a defendant (the
EC) to a complainant (Peru) in the spirit of regulatory autonomy failed to deliver any
impact due to the AB’s subsequent prescription of a low evidentiary threshold in
discharging Peru’s BOP (whether to prove).52
The Court’s subsequent dilution of any impacts which the initial allocation of the
BOP might have delivered through lessening the evidentiary threshold, standards of proof,
in Sardines testifies that the BOP issues are “hermeneutical” in nature. It is in the Court’s
interpretive discretion,53 or more critically, prudence, to resolve who to prove, whether to
prove and what to prove in each dispute on a case-by-case basis. Even the conventional
focal point, i.e., who to prove, is subject to this interpretive discretion because in most
cases the allocation of an initial BOP is not obvious from the text itself and often requires
the Court’s creative construction. This interpretive task concerning the BOP eventually
becomes the Court’s own responsibility or burden under the DSU in that the task falls
within the realm of “an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”54 In the end, how the Court
discharges this burden determines not only the destiny of a given case but also the
legitimacy of the Court.

50

Id. at ¶290 (underlining added).
See Horn & Weiler, supra note_, at 272.
52
See Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1,
31(2004) (viewing that the AB’s reversal of the Sardine panel’s ruling on the allocation of the burden of
proof “had no effect on the outcome of the case”).
53
Cf. Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at 227 (referring to “a tool which is
particularly attractive to adjudicators: clouded in an air of procedural neutrality but, by the same token,
falling to a considerable extent within the quasi-discretionary powers of the panel”).
54
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112, 120 (1994) (hereinafter DSU). But cf. Walker, supra note_ .
(submitting that the Appellate Body should impose on panels a minimum requirement of “rational
inference,” defined as “minimal evidence that any reasonable person would consider necessary to support
such a finding,” namely a “preponderance standard of proof”).
51
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This hermeneutical burden appears more salient to the WTC than to domestic
courts. International agreements, such as the SPS Agreement, are essentially a product of
compromise after a series of negotiations, which expounds the inherent ambiguity of their
texts.55 To project a WTO Member’s concrete (contextualized) behavior (an alleged
violation) onto these abstract (de-contextualized) texts necessitates panels’ or the AB’s
creative (re-) construction of these texts beyond mechanical application of them.
Although it is WTO members themselves which ultimately (re-) interpret them in a
legislative sense,56 to resolve a dispute through the aforementioned (re-) construction is
reserved to a panel or the AB.
Finally, the court-oriented approach to the BOP proposed here is more amenable
to the practical reality than the conventional, party-oriented approach. The BOP, in a
conventional narrow sense, only concerns facts, not law. Matters of law are decided
exclusively by judges (jura novit curia). Parties bear no BOP as to issues of law even
though they often present legal arguments in their favor.57 However, in practice the line
between law and facts is blurred. Factum probandum is often enmeshed in legal claims and
arguments. Under the court-oriented approach, the Court tends to correspond better
with this blurred distinction since it may feel less compelled to dichotomize facts and law
for the purpose of the BOP. After all, the Court interprets both facts and law.
B. Three Hermeneutical Burdens of the Court

1. Who to Prove
As discussed above, parties may not predict precisely who will bear the proof
burden in advance since it is basically a matter of the Court’s interpretation.58 For
example, Article 5, paragraph 10 of the SPS Agreement establishes that an SPS measure
conforming to international standards is presumed to be consistent with relevant SPS
provisions. One might interpret this provision as imposing the BOP on a regulating

55

See notably John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 39 GERMAN Y. B.
INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (viewing that “the decision-making and voting procedures of the WTO, although
much improved over the GATT, still leave much to be desired”); John H. Jackson, International Economic
Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) (viewing that “treaties are often an
awkward albeit necessary method of designing institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they
do not solve many problems”).
56
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1148 (1994) (hereinafter WTO Agreement) (“The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”).
57
Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion, supra note _, at 242.
58
Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1252
(1998).
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(defending) party in case it fails to enjoy such presumption.59 In this line, the Hormones
panel ruled that the EC should demonstrate that its ban on hormoned beef would still be
necessary, although the ban departed from the Codex standard, since the standard was
not good enough for the purpose of the EC’s regulation. In other words, the existence of
the presumption would construct members’ duty to follow international standards under
Article 3.1 as a general obligation and an opt-out clause under Article 3.3 as an
exception.60
However, this position was patently rejected by the AB, which instead interpreted
the same provision in a diametrically opposite fashion. The AB attempted to legitimize its
opposite interpretation from a textual ground, although a reasonable inference from the
text (Articles 3.1 and 3.3) would lead to the panel’s original interpretation. The AB
simply renounced the general obligation/exception relationship in Articles 3.1 and 3.3,
upholding members’ regulatory autonomy which may even encompass a right to depart
from international standards despite an explicit obligation to follow those standards under
Article 3.1.61 The AB held that:
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation
by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and
recommendations.62
To the AB, harmonization of SPS measures through international standards under
Article 3.1 merely embodies an aspiration, not a legal obligation, which is “yet to be
realized in the future.”63
Critically, these diverging interpretive postures between the panel and the AB are
attributable to more than textual grounds. They represent different institutional
objectives and purposes (teloi) which the panel and the AB project to the text whenever
they interpret it. These different teloi reflect different Zeitgeists shaping the development
of international trade law.
One of the principal criticisms directed to the GATT was its embedded pro-trade
bias. Founded against the historical background of economic balkanization in the
interwar period, the original teleology of the GATT was free trade. Although it did
recognize certain compromise by permitting non-trade values, such as protection of
human health or the environment, these values were upheld only as “exceptions” under
59

See John J. Barcelo III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment-The GATT and
Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 774 (1994).
60
Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
¶¶8.86-8.87, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997).
61
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶¶169-171, WT/DS26/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
62
Id. at ¶165 (emphasis original).
63
Id. (emphasis original).
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Article XX. In other words, these values were only secondary to the main value of free
trade, represented by basic obligations, such as the National Treatment principle.64
Furthermore, these values were very hard to recognize in a practical sense since
exceptions are meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly. In fact, in the entire GATT
history, not a single non-trade value was upheld under Article XX.65 Under this pro-trade
bias which structurally downgrades non-trade values as exceptions, a burden of proving
that any given regulation is legitimate (non-protectionist) and necessary rests on a
regulating country. One might justify this position by observing that any regulation is
presumed to be protectionist since any government tends to favor its domestic producers
in designing the regulation.66
Unsurprisingly, this structural and empirical pro-trade bias of the GATT regime
drew much criticism from both environmentalists and domestic regulators. A number of
NGOs have vehemently attacked the neo-liberal mantra of free trade-cum-globalization
which they believe undermines more paramount values such as environmental protection
or social justice. In addition, the rise of the modern welfare state, which is expected to
respond to citizens’ heightened demands for better social hygiene, turned a once
deregulatory ethos to a re-regulatory one. This elevated recognition of domestic
regulations naturally altered the political dynamics around them. In the past, risk
regulations were mostly regarded as technical and professional issues which concerned a
narrow epistemic community of scientists and policymakers.67 However, once highlighted
and thus politicized, risk regulations have become everybody’s business.68
Out of this novel pro-regulation ethos, negotiators in the Uruguay Round created
the SPS/TBT Agreement which escalated those non-trade values once regarded as mere
exceptions under GATT Article XX to an autonomous “right” to regulate. The TBT
preamble recognizes that “no country should be prevented from taking measures
necessary . . . for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the
environment”69; SPS Article 2.1 specifies that “Members have the right to take sanitary and

64

See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF
THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003).
65

See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory
State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant
Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD
TRADE LAW 142 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000).
66
Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and the Environment: How Should WTO Panels Review
Environmental Regulations Under GATT III and XX?, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 441, 449 (1996).
67
See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization
and International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant
Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 27, 28
(1998).
68
Id., at 52.
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A, the WTO Agreement, supra note_, pmbl.
(hereinafter TBT).
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phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health.”70
Silhouetted against this new ethos valuing regulatory autonomy of member
countries, the AB would put members’ right to regulate before voluntary international
standards, even though the SPS envisions harmonization around these standards. This
value system eventually led the AB to reverse the otherwise plausible interpretation by
the Hormones and Sardines panels which imposed on regulating parties the initial burden
of proving that these standards were scientifically unjustified or ineffective/inappropriate
to achieve their regulatory goals, and instead required the complaining parties to prove
that these standards were supported by science and effective/appropriate.71
2. What to Prove
The second burden of the Court on the BOP is to decide what parties should
prove to discharge their BOP. The Court’s interpretive orientation in this matter is often
embodied in certain doctrinal tests, e.g., three- or four-prong tests. By designing these
tests, the Court exercises its hermeneutical power in a way which steers parties’
adversarial battle to the direction that it chooses. This aspect of BOP was first raised by
the AB in Shirts and Blouses. The AB viewed that:
[W]e consider the question of what the importing Member must demonstrate
at the time of its determination. . . . In the context of the GATT 1994 and
the WTO Agreement, precisely how much and precisely what kind of
evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily
vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.72
Although this aspect of BOP has not been salient, at least explicitly, the Court
relied heavily on it in moving the proceeding forward. For example, the Hormones panel
required the EC to demonstrate that it actually conducted a risk assessment by itself,
proceduralizing the duty to assess risks.73 However, the AB rejected this procedural aspect
of risk assessment obligation, leaving only its substantive part. Therefore, the EC only had
to demonstrate that there existed a rational relationship between its measure and a risk
assessment.74 Under this ruling, the EC could have even outsourced its risk assessment.
70

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the WTO Agreement,
supra note_, art. 2.1 (hereinafter SPS).
71
See John H. Knox, The Judicial Review of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43-4 (2004).
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Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India, pt. IV, WT/DS33/AB/R (April 25, 1997) (emphasis added).
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Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
¶1008, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997).
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Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶193, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
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Furthermore, according to the AB, a risk assessment need not be based on a mainstream
scientific opinion: even a minority opinion is sufficient to justify the risk assessment.75
These two interpretations by the AB, which were diametrically opposite to those
of the panel, would have allowed the EC to rely on serendipitous studies which had come
out only after it banned the hormone-treated beef.76 In other words, the AB’s liberal
interpretation on the risk assessment requirement practically reduced the EC’s proof
burdens because the EC would have easily cherry picked any novel yet controversial
scientific opinions and presented them to discharge its proof burdens under Article 5.1.77
3. Whether to Prove
After the Court decides who should bear the BOP over disputed facts and what
exactly parties should prove, its last interpretive task over the BOP is to determine
whether parties bearing the proof burdens have actually discharged them. In other words,
the Court should resolve the quantum (standard) of proof issue, i.e., how much evidence
would be sufficient for a party to establish a prima facie case or to rebut the presumption
that the initial prima facie case created in each case.78
Therefore, when a complaining party claims that the other party violates Article
2.2 of the SPS Agreement by maintaining its sanitary measure without scientific
justification, the complaining party should prove that there is no rational relationship
between the defending party’s measure and the scientific evidence. After all, the Court
will decide whether such a relationship exists “on a case-by-case basis” taking into
account the “particular circumstances of the case.”79
Likewise, the Salmon panel originally found that the alleged Australian risk
assessment on imported salmon (1996 Final Report) “addresse[d] and to some extent
evaluate[d] a series of risk reduction factors, in particular, on a disease-by-disease basis.”80
Accordingly, the panel assumed that the 1996 Final Report did “evaluate the likelihood
of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according to the SPS measures which
might be applied” in compliance with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. However, the
AB disagreed. It viewed that “some evaluation of the likelihood is not enough.” 81
75

Id. at ¶194.
Reinhard Quick & Andreas Blüthner, Has the Appellate Body Erred?: An Appraisal and Criticism
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Therefore, how much evaluation needs to be shown to discharge the burden of proof
regarding risk assessment depends totally on the Court’s interpretation under each
circumstance.
It was in this way that the AB in Gambling concluded that the U.S. demonstrated
successfully the necessity of its ban on remote gambling, while Antigua failed to identify a
reasonably available alternative measure which might have rebutted the U.S. position.82
In the same vein, the AB in Korean Beef held that Korea failed to meet its burden of
proving that alternatives to the dual retails system were not reasonably available.83
Intriguingly, this onus of proof84 often plays a face-making function when the
Court delivers its final decision. In any WTO dispute, a defending party loses for two
reasons. First, it may lose in an “apodeicdic” fashion when the Court finds that its
measure has violated, i.e., been inconsistent with, the WTO norms. Second, it may also
lose in an “apagogical” fashion when the Court finds that it fails to demonstrate that its
measure is not inconsistent with the WTO norms; to wit, it fails to discharge its burden of
proving that its measure has not violated the WTO norms. The same logic applies to a
situation in which a complaining party loses. It may lose when the Court finds that the
measure in question is consistent with the WTO norms; it may also lose when the Court
finds that the complaining party fails to establish its prima facie case that the measure is
not consistent with the WTO norms.
In both situations, the latter (apagogical) type of finding appears less damaging
than the former to the losing party. While the former tends to blatantly reject a party’s
claim, the latter tends to provisionally suspend the claim in a given dispute. In other
words, in the former occasion, a losing party may not confidently make the same claim in
any future dispute since it has been struck down. In the latter occasion, however, it may
still make the same claim if it comes up with more or better pieces of evidence which may
convince the Court. Therefore, the Court may gracefully mitigate the damage of the
losing party by attributing its defeat not to a substantive reason (violation) but rather to a
technical, procedural failure, even though such differentiation would not change the
outcome of the case.
4. A Cumulative Nature of Three Burdens
These interpretive burdens that the Court bears in deciding who to prove, what to
prove and whether to prove are interrelated and cumulative in nature, and should thus be
understood in their entirety. No single aspect alone would be sufficient to capture true
hermeneutical attributes of the BOP.
82
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As discussed above, the conventional focal point in the BOP, i.e., the assignment
issue (who to prove), may not be too critical to the outcome of the case because there are
hardly any cases where the initial allocation of BOP solely determines the outcome of a
litigation absent any prevailing evidence. Moreover, an alternating, ping pong-like shift of
BOP between parties rarely happens. A panel or the AB simply interprets both facts and
law based on a collection of arguments and evidence submitted by both parties as well as
other undisputed facts.
Thus, the Court’s decision on who to prove may not change the outcome of the
dispute. For example, the Sardines panel ruled that a regulating party departing from an
international standard should bear the burden of proving that such standard would not be
appropriate to the level of protection it pursued.85 Although the AB reversed the panel’s
finding and ruled that the complainants, not defendants, bear the burden of proving that
the international standard would be appropriate, such reversal did not change the
outcome of the case: the EC still lost since the AB simply found that the complainant met
the proof burden.86
In addition, new aspects of BOP, i.e., what to prove and whether to prove, also
influence the conventional aspect of BOP, i.e., who to prove. Although a defending party
(a regulating party) in general bears the burden of proving that a measure in question was
necessary or relating to achieve the putative regulatory goal in terms of an affirmative
defense (exception) under GATT Article XX,87 the WTC may instead require a
complaining party to bear a heavier burden than usual in the preceding stage, i.e., when it
establishes a prima facie case that the defending party violated a general obligation such as
the National Treatment principle. This heavier standard of proof in an earlier stage on
the complaining party tends to relieve the defending party of its own BOP at a later
(exception) stage.
For example, the AB in Asbestos held that the complaining party (Canada)’s initial
burden of proving that France discriminated against Canadian asbestos in favor of its
domestic substitute fibers was a “heavy” one.88 This holding reflects the AB’s critical
observation that the carcinogenic asbestos and risk-free substitute fibers could not be
treated alike.89 The AB found that:
“This carcinogenicity, or toxicity, constitutes, as we see it, a defining aspect of the
physical properties of chrysotile asbestos fibers. The evidence indicates that PCG
85
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fibers, in contrast, do not share these properties, at least to the same extent. We
do not see how this highly significant physical difference cannot be a consideration
in examining the physical properties of a product as part of a determination of
“likeness” under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.”90
Here, by incorporating health risks, which concerned GATT Article XX(b), into
Article III:4 (National Treatment) consideration,91 the AB dramatically increased the
complaining party (Canada)’s burden of establishing a prima facie case that Canadian
asbestos, which was banned, and French substitute fibers, which were permitted, would be
like products and thus deserve equal treatment. In fact, Canada’s initial onus of proof
which the AB’s pro-regulation interpretation increased seemed too heavy for Canada to
meet in a practical sense. It would be highly unlikely to expect that Canada would ever
persuade the AB into accepting that Canadian asbestos and French substitute fibers are
like despite the AB’s foregoing risk-driven interpretation on physical properties. As a
result, the defending party (the EC) was in effect relieved of its burden to prove that the
asbestos ban was necessary to protect human health in France.
Therefore, the AB’s escalation, via interpretation, of a probative threshold
(standard of proof) not only de facto shifted the burden of proof as to the necessity of the
regulation but also created a de facto presumption of regulatory legitimacy which seems
practically irrefutable.
A similar reversal of proof burden through the Court’s construction of what to
prove is found in Japan-Agricultural Products. Under the traditional necessity test under
GATT Article XX, the defending party (Japan) would have had to demonstrate that its
measure was the least trade restrictive means as an affirmative defense. In this case,
however, the AB ruled that the complaining party (the U.S.) should demonstrate that a
reasonable less-restrictive alternative to the regulation in question could have been
feasible.92

III. What Lies beneath the World Trade Court’s Burden: The
Judicialization of Science
A. The Judicial Regulation of Science
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Investigating the WTO’s jurisprudence on risk regulations (e.g., SPS and TBT
measures) under a new paradigm over the BOP, which is shifted from the parties’ burden
to the Court’s burden, enables us to probe the Court’s rationale or “value” which may be
defined as a set of basic priorities and assumptions around which its hermeneutics
operates. Analyzing the jurisprudential track record of the last decade over risk
regulations, one might reach a conclusion that the Court has not only adjudicated
scientific cases but also judicialized scientific questions. In other words, the Court has
rendered definite scientific answers, instead of merely resolving science-related disputes.
This phenomenon of judicialization of science was launched in a paradigmatic
case in this area, i.e., Hormones. Originally, the panel in Hormones imposed an initial BOP
as to Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement (the prohibition of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination) on the complaining party (the United States). The United States argued
that the EC’s asymmetrical regulatory treatment between naturally occurring hormones
(in meat and other foods) which led to no regulatory intervention at all, and the
artificially injected ones for growth promotion purposes which led to a total ban was
arbitrary and unjustifiable.93 Having assessed the United States’ argument, the evidence
that it adduced, and the expert opinions,94 the panel seemed to find that the initial BOP
had shifted to the EC which should rebut what the United States had proven.95 The panel
held that the EC had not met its BOP.96
However, the AB reversed the panel’s finding of the EC’s arbitrarily and
unjustifiably asymmetrical regulatory treatment between naturally-occurring hormones
(no regulation at all) and artificially administered hormones (a total ban). Here, the AB
endorsed the EC’s adoption of a zero-tolerance policy on hormone-treated beef by
denying a comparison itself between these two situations in direct defiance of the
conventional science which experts (scientists) represented in their opinions in this
dispute. These scientists viewed that health risks from residual hormones in our body
would be the same regardless of “differences in pathways taken or metabolites,” i.e.,
whether endogenously present or consumed via foods.97 Nonetheless, the AB replaced
this conventional science by its own version when it transcendentally declared that there
exists a “fundamental difference” between these two situations.98 It further criticized any
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attempt to compare them as “absurdity.”99 Therefore, the AB sided with the EC which
also argued that such fundamental difference in these two situations justified
fundamentally different treatments (no intervention and a total ban) in them.
The AB’s new science is quite reminiscent of the Kuhnian paradigm shift in that
the AB changed the way which one should read and interpret the science as to hormones
in food.100 It rejected the conventional science, i.e., laboratory science, over a common
sense-based science which may befit the “real world where people live and work and die.”
In doing so, the AB effectively created a new presumption in favor of the EC’s zerotolerance policy which was embodied in a total ban on hormone-treated beef. Suddenly,
the hitherto defensive EC’s position seemed to turn offensive. Now, the United States
should bear the burden of proving that the EC’s ban was still arbitrary and unjustifiable.
Alas, however, the presumption is irrebuttable since the AB opined that the EC’s
regulatory choice was basically incommensurable and sui generis. Simply, there exist no
referential points against which one might evaluate its scientific justification. This might
be bad news to the United States in this adversarial game.
B. Scientific Uncertainty, Hercules and Phronesis
The Hormones case is not an isolated, idiosyncratic anecdote: it certainly shares
the same milieu with a modern ethos of social hygiene and welfare state fueled by highly
emotionalized and thus politicized scandals on mad cow diseases and Frankenfoods.101
Amid scientific uncertainty characterized by both too little and too much information,
the same problem often generates totally different responses: some are risk-friendly as in
the United States; others are risk-averse as in Europe. As Richard Gaskin observed, “it is
now more fashionable to investigate the political and cultural frameworks surrounding
scientific expertise.”102 These diametrically opposite regulatory philosophies in different
jurisdictions naturally entail highly dogmatic use of the BOP. In asserting one’s own
position, one tends to employ polemic strategies to highlight the opponent’s inability to
disprove her default premise (presumption).103 Emanuel Kant earlier coined this tendency
as the “polemical employment of pure reason.” Kant observed that:
Here the contention is not that [one’s] own assertions may not, perhaps,
be false, but only that no one can assert the opposite with apodeictic
certainty, or even, indeed, with a greater degree of likelihood.”104
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Obviously, such dogmatic confrontation between parties tends to result in a
perpetual dispute armed with “arguments-from-ignorance,”105 which the Court may want
to end with its vested judicial authority. Here, the Court inevitably assumes the role of
transcendental tribunal, which Ronald Dworkin dubbed Hercules, which always renders
“right answers” in that it brings to the dispute finality “at the margins of scientific
knowledge” upon which parties themselves can never agree.106 In other words, the
dimension in which the Court bestows its judgment upon disputants is transcendental
because such judgment may not be reduced to those empirical scientific facts which
disputants themselves maneuver against each other: the decision is of law, its
hermeneutics and values behind it.
Although the Court does embrace scientific facts which disputants adduce as
evidence supporting their arguments, it never accepts them as they are. Instead, the
Court assesses and interprets them in a way which sustains its own conclusion. Even
expert opinions which the Court hears are not meant to replace the Court’s own
judgment. The Court is free to selectively adopt those professional views or even depart
from them entirely. More fundamentally it is within the Court’s discretion to decide when
and whether to hear those opinions in the first place.
The Court’s transcendental judicialization of science is amenable to a skeptical, or
at least ambivalent, posture toward the authority of science echoed by Karl Popper and
Thomas Kuhn. Popper was highly doubtful of modern science’s capability to establish
universal laws and thus understood science only as a process, rather than the product of
investigation.107 In the Popperian perspective, one may prove that a certain scientific
finding is wrong, but cannot prove that such finding is true in a definite, apodeictic
sense.108 From this perspective, any scientific discovery only tentatively holds water until
it is proven wrong in the future.109 In a similar vein, Kuhn conceptualized this inherent
limited value and influence of modern science in his famed term, “paradigm.”110 A
paradigm of specific scientific disciplines (“normal science”) created and exercised by a
selective scientific community is subject to being shifted in a different socio-cultural
setting. Once shifted, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable.
The AB in Hormones appears to subscribe to the Kuhnian perspective. To the AB,
an international standard would be a reification of normal science observed by a
narrowly-defined epistemic community such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
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This specific version of science may not be authoritative enough to preempt different
paradigms which a regulating country may adopt in determining its own appropriate level
of protection. Therefore, the AB refused to impose the BOP to a regulating party which
has decided to depart from the international standard.111 Likewise, in deciding whether
the regulating party has conducted risk assessment based on scientific justification, the
AB did not prioritize a certain paradigm espoused by a certain group of scientists, such as
a mainstream view, over a different paradigm, such as a minority view, because these two
would be incommensurable.
The AB even rejected a comparison of residual hormone levels in human body
and food with those in beef treated with growth promoting hormones. The AB reached
this conclusion rather summarily, observing that any attempt to compare these two
regulatory situations would lead to “absurdity.”112 This phronesis-driven paradigm rebuffs
the normal science reincarnated in the Codex standard on the residual hormone levels,
thereby rendering these two paradigms incomparable. To the AB as a reincarnation of
Dworkian Hercules, political freedom based on reality and common sense should trump
awkward laboratory science. This phronesis, not techne, should be a guiding principle
under which the Court allocated an initial BOP as well as prescribe what to prove and
whether to prove. Under this cognitive framework, it may be justified that a society reacts
more seriously to any carcinogenic risks from environmental asbestos concentration (1
death per 100,000 or less) than to those from car accidents (1,600 deaths per 100,000),
despite an enormous stochastic gap between these two situations.113
Here, the AB’s position is akin to Edmund Husserl’s criticism of modern science as
a “mathematization of nature” totally detached from the “life-world” (Lebenswelt).114 From
the AB’s prioritization of common sense (wisdom) over laboratory science (knowledge),
one might catch a glimpse of the tradition of critical philosophy of anti-scientism which
accuses scientific positivism espoused by August Conte of a self-fulfilling prophesy fatally
alienated from actual life-world and human interests.115 In this sense, the AB’s rendition
of science is close to the titular “trans-science” whose properties lie on a continuum
between pure scientific facts and value (policy) judgment.116
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Perhaps the AB responded to the “democratic” concerns associated with regulatory
decisions. Robert Howse locates a democratic value in the AB’s SPS jurisprudence.
Howse views that the AB instilled the value of democratic rationality among citizens in
the SPS interpretation by reserving a certain deliberative space where citizens’ value
judgments can effectively trump any mainstream science.117 To Howse, the AB’s rejection
of a widely accepted distinction between risk assessment (based on facts and science) and
risk management (based on non-scientific, value-oriented judgments) might attest to the
AB’s fidelity to the democratic value in that deliberative room may be bigger in the
absence of a strict dichotomy between science and value. After all, the AB’s image of
science does not originate from laboratories but from the “real world where people live
and work and die.”118 To the AB, science, at least for the purposes of SPS, should be
based on practical wisdom (phronesis), rather than on technical knowledge (techne).

IV. Appraising the World Trade Court’s Burden: A Critical Perspective
A. Diverging Oracles from Hercules: Incoherent Jurisprudence
In the area of social regulation, in particular risk regulations such as SPS measures,
the Court’s interpretive posture discussed above, i.e., judicialization of science, has been a
driving force behind the WTO jurisprudence. Unfortunately, however, the
aforementioned Herculean “right answer” thesis, which has been embedded in the
Court’s prescriptive hermeneutics and thus applied to highly controversial scientific
disputes, has created incoherent jurisprudence as it renders diverging findings over similar
provisions or situations under the SPS Agreement and GATT Article XX. This
jurisprudential incoherency can be found in three different yet still interrelated aspects:
within the SPS Agreement, between the SPS Agreement and GATT Article XX, and
finally between law and facts.
This incoherency is problematic since it costs the WTO jurisprudence its vital
asset, i.e., predictability. In addition, as Ronald Allen poignantly observed, while
consistency may not ensure correctness, incoherency tends to guarantee errors.119 After
all, diverging oracles from Hercules might confuse its receivers and therefore become a
disservice, not a contribution, to them.
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1. Incoherency within the SPS Agreement
In Hormones, the AB was faithful to the principle of in dubio mitius. The AB
basically characterized the health risks, i.e., carcinogenicity from beef hormones, as sui
generis and incomparable to otherwise similar regulatory situations, such as health risks
from endogenously occurring hormones. Hence, it found an unarbitrary and justifiable
distinction between these two regulatory situations. The AB therefore accorded the EU a
strong presumption in favour of its regulatory determination, which made it impossible for
the complainant, the United States, to rebut. In the same context, the AB, quite contrary
to how SPS text is structured, accorded the EC the right to depart from the relevant
international standards (Codex standards) as well as the right to choose a zero-tolerance
level of protection, disregarding the possibilities of any controlled use.
Nonetheless, the Court has often departed from this deferential, sovereigntypreserving hermeneutics in subsequent cases involving similar regulatory circumstances.
In Salmon, the AB simply viewed the risks of diseases from ocean-caught salmon as
comparable to those from herring used as bait and live ornamental finfish, while Australia
vehemently argued for unique regulatory challenges that foreign salmon generated in
terms of potential diseases. Australia noted that “salmon represented the only finfish on
which a species-specific level of protection had been established”120 and that “risks
associated with other aquatic animals could not be compared in the absence of a risk
analysis.”121
Here, Australia’s regulatory posture seems quite similar to that of the EU in
Hormones, i.e., risk-averse, zero-tolerance level of protection in the absence of positive
scientific evidence corroborating the hormoned beef’s safety. In other words, Australia
would not need to adduce apodeicdic evidence proving that its ban on ocean-caught
salmon is justifiable. Yet, the AB, in upholding the panel’s view, opined that a common
risk of contracting only one common disease is sufficient enough to make two regulatory
situations comparable.122 According to the AB’s approach, any two regulatory situations
may still be comparable as long as they share at least one common element (e.g., disease)
even though one is subject to additional risks (e.g., multiple, unknown diseases) than the
other. Therefore, the AB substituted its own risk-friendly regulatory determination for
Australia’s more cautious one.
However, why should these two regulatory situations in Salmon, i.e., risks from
ocean-caught salmon and those from herring used as bait and live ornamental finfish, be
treated as “comparable,” while two other regulatory situations in Hormones, i.e., risks from
naturally occurring hormones and those from artificially administered hormones, were
120
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treated as “incomparable” despite that health risks from residual hormones in our body
would be the same regardless of “differences in pathways taken or metabolites”?123 The
AB rendered no explanation at all on this serious jurisprudential incoherence.
Once the AB framed these two regulatory situations, i.e., regulating the
importation of ocean-caught salmon, and that of herring used as baits and live
ornamental finfish, comparable, the rest of the analysis under Article 5.5 seems to be
rather automatic. First, the presence of sheer difference in regulatory treatment between
the two situations, i.e., prohibiting importation and permitting importation, led the AB to
generate a nearly irrebuttable presumption of “arbitrary and unjustifiable” discrimination
in favour of the complainant as the complainant only had to demonstrate the existence of
such difference. It was the defendant (regulating state) which should rebut the
complainant’s argument by proving in turn that its regulation would be still unarbitrary
and justifiable, which seemed to be quite daunting.
Second, such arbitrariness and unjustifiability, once found, determines the onus of
burden as to the rest elements of Article 5.5 to the detriment of defendants. Under the
euphemistic labels of “warning signals,” the AB simply derived additional presumptions
on the existence of “discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”
which are also detrimental to the defendant, from the original presumption of
arbitrariness and unjustifiability.124 Under these circumstances, the defendant could
hardly rebut such strong presumptions.
This second-guessing on risk determination by the Court, which is certainly at
variance with Hormones, culminates with its selective imposition of proof burden on a
specific group of products in question. In Japan-Apple, a complaining party (the United
States), in proving that Japan’s sanitary measures against the United States’ apples were
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, presented arguments and evidence
concerning only “mature, symptomless” apples.125 Japan argued that the United States
should also establish a prima facie case that “infected” apples would pose no risk as mature
and symptomless apples would.126 However, both the panel and the AB ruled that it was
Japan which should come up with any scientific evidence for such risk that infected
apples would cause.127 The AB held that:
[T]he Appellate Body's statement in EC – Hormones does not imply that the
complaining party is responsible for providing proof of all facts raised in relation to
the issue of determining whether a measure is consistent with a given provision of
123
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a covered agreement. In other words, although the complaining party bears the
burden of proving its case, the responding party must prove the case it seeks to
make in response.128
Critically, this innocuous-sounding construction by the AB on the BOP in fact
betrays its hidden hermeneutical agenda, i.e., judicialization of science. The AB
rationalized such mitigated BOP borne to the United States, i.e., the burden of making a
prima facie case only with respect to “mature, symptomless” apples, on the ground that
other apples, such as immature, infected apples, pose only a “small” or “debatable” risk
which derives from human, technical errors and illegal actions.129 Here, the AB played the
role of scientist, rather than judge. As a result, the AB bestowed on the United States a
presumption of safety with respect to all apples it exports to Japan by allowing it to limit
its proof burden to those apples in a normal situation. However, a sanitary regulation does
not necessarily presuppose such normal situations. On the contrary, a sanitary regulation
should take into account those errors and illegal actions which might actually happen.
Basing its level of protection on such an optimistic scenario can hardly be imagined in any
regulatory jurisdictions. In this context, the AB’s posture disregarding such risks, albeit
small, is an unbearable risk-taking, which is a stark contrast with Hormones advocating a
zero-tolerance approach to health risks.130
All in all, these substantive rulings on specific risks which result in a risk-taking
approach in Salmon and Japan-Apples depart blatantly from the deferential approach that
the AB had taken in comparable cases, such as Hormones, in which the AB endorsed a
“zero-tolerance” regulatory policy. Accordingly, the AB’s position deprives regulating
states, such as Australia and Japan, of a presumption of legality (a right to regulate) and
requires a heavy burden of adducing positive scientific evidence proving that peculiar
risks might occur in the imported products in questions, such as ocean-caught Pacific
salmon and apples from the United States.
2. Incoherency between GATT and the SPS Agreement
In addition to the SPS Agreement, Article XX (General Exceptions) of GATT
also provides a justification mechanism with which a regulating country can prove that
their health or other social regulations are necessary to achieve legitimate policy
objectives. As within the SPS Agreement, one can witness yet another jurisprudential
incoherency between the SPS Agreement and GATT over similar regulatory situations.
The Court’s own substantive evaluation of various societal risks in deciding whether a
certain measure was really necessary to achieve a putative regulatory goal under GATT
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Article XX tends to complicate a holistic understanding of its jurisprudence related to the
similar regulatory situation subject to the SPS Agreement which bestows a right to
regulate.
At first blush, the Court’s interpretations on GATT and SPS seem to converge. In
determining whether a French ban over Canadian asbestos products was necessary to
protect human health under GATT Article XX (b), the Asbestos court issued the SPSline of statement, i.e., “it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”131
Then, the AB upheld the zero-tolerance policy over asbestos adopted by France, noting
that “controlled use” would not be an alternative since it would not guarantee a zero risk
that France had pursued.132 Undoubtedly, this strong presumption in favor of France’s
regulatory autonomy tends to relieve France of its otherwise heavy burden of proving that
its ban was necessary to protect human health as an exception, not as a right, under
GATT Article XX (b).
However, the pendulum of the Court’s substantive interpretation on risks and
regulations swing to the opposite direction in other similar situations under GATT
Article XX. In Korean Beef, the United States challenged the Korean “dual retail system”
under which foreign beef should be sold separately from domestic beef (Hanwoo) to
prevent deceptive practices by retailers to misrepresent cheaper imported beef as more
expensive Hanwoo. This rather drastic measure, which is in fact a zero-risk approach to
these fraudulent practices, could be deemed necessary considering not only high
commercial values on Hanwoo but also certain socio-cultural attachments to this
indigenous beef within the unique context of Korean society. Even the panel
acknowledged that the system was introduced at a time when these frauds were
widespread in the beef sector and that it “does appear to reduce the opportunities and
thus the temptations for butchers to misrepresent [less expensive] foreign beef for [more
expensive] domestic beef.”133
If a reasonable person applies the Hormone and Asbestos case law to this situation,
she would find few difficulties in finding that the dual retail system was necessary to
prevent frauds. However, in a diametrically opposite posture from Hormones and Asbestos,
the Court in Korean Beef second-guessed the Korean government’s regulatory judgment
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through the creation of a quite intrusive doctrine, the “weighing and balancing” test. The
AB viewed that:
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not "indispensable",
may nevertheless be "necessary" within the contemplation of Article
XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of
factors which prominently include the contribution made by the
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue,
the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports.134
This doctrine strips regulating members of their regulatory autonomy in that the
Court, not the regulating country, would judge over all the details related to a given
measure in question. In effect, the doctrine usurps from the regulating country a critical
presumption of in dubio mitius and thus gravely increases its proof burden in litigation.
Obviously, this omniscient attitude of the Court is yet another manifestation of its
Herculean image. The Court appears to believe that it, not the regulating country, is
capable of delivering right answers on critical regulatory questions, such as “the extent to
which the measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued, the securing of
compliance with the law or regulation at issue.”135
Saddled with this commandeering interpretive posture, Hercules in Korean Beef de
facto overrode Hormones without rendering any plausible reasons. First, in Hormones, the
AB refused to equate a regulatory situation over naturally-occurring hormones with that
over artificially-treated hormones, despite the conflicting scientific evidence. However, in
Korean Beef, the AB trivialized the uniqueness of the Korean regulatory challenge over
domestic beef by comparing Hanwoo with other more mundane foods, such as pork and
seafood.136 Tellingly, the very fact that Korea had not suffered any major scandals on the
misrepresentation of foreign pork or foreign seafood as domestic counterparts testifies to
the incomparability between these two regulatory situations.
Second, by implementing a dual retail system, the Korean government took a very
conservative approach toward this problem, which is analogous to a zero-tolerance policy
in Hormones. The AB should have respected this high level of protection in the beef
sector by the Korean government, as it accepted the EC’s total ban as legitimate and thus
rejected the complainant’s arguments on the “controlled use.” Yet, in Korean Beef, the AB
replaced the Korean regulatory determination by its own right answer and ruled that
Korea could have used softer measures, which are tantamount to the controlled use in
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Hormones, such as fines, record-keeping and policing.137 Here, the AB simply ignored a
fundamental fact that the dual retail system had to be introduced only because these
conventional enforcement measures did not work.
Critically, this Herculean second-guessing shaped the contour of the Court’s
decision on the BOP. First, the AB, siding with the panel, placed a high proof burden on
Korea under which Korea should prove that “no alternative measure consistent with the
WTO Agreement is reasonably available at present.”138 Then, the AB ruled that those
conventional enforcement measures applied to the same kind of illegal behaviors were
reasonably expected.139 Therefore, the AB simply dismissed the Korean zero-tolerance
policy as unpersuasive, i.e., failing to discharge the abovementioned proof burden,140
instead of according Korea a margin of appreciation on its own regulatory situation, as the
AB certainly did in Hormones. The AB’s own regulatory solution, which made the dual
retail system look unreasonable, sounds almost admonishing. The AB viewed that:
Violations of laws and regulations like the Korean Unfair Competition Act
can be expected to be routinely investigated and detected through
selective, but well-targeted, controls of potential wrongdoers. The control
of records will assist in selecting the shops to which the police could pay
particular attention.141
It seems puzzling why the AB did not rule in the same way over this kind of
regulatory alternative (controlled use) in Hormones and Asbestos. In Asbestos, Canada
demonstrated that technological innovations created various regulatory alternatives to a
total asbestos ban adopted by France, and that a number of countries were in fact
implementing these alternatives.142 In its third-party submission, Zimbabwe also pointed
out some plausible alternatives to the ban, including the disclosure requirement assisting
consumers to make informed decisions on asbestos products as well as the certification
system for those who treat asbestos.143 Nonetheless, the AB ruled that:
[I]t is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the
level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given
situation. France has determined, and the Panel accepted, that the chosen
level of health protection by France is a "halt" to the spread of asbestosrelated health risks.144
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In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any
alternative measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the
very risk that the Decree seeks to "halt". Such an alternative measure
would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of health
protection.145
This utter incoherence between Hormones/Asbestos (SPS) and Korean Beef
(GATT) is quite problematic in that it tends to send a confusing signal to the audience in
the global trading community and thus discourages a holistic understanding of the Court’s
jurisprudence.
3. Inconsistency between Law and Facts
The Court has addressed the BOP question, such as whether to prove or what to
prove, in a selective, and therefore inconsistent, manner between a matter of law and that
of fact. Sometimes, the Court sidesteps the BOP question by constructing certain
controversial issues as a matter of fact and thus deferring the question to the lower
tribunal (panel)’s interpretation. Some other times, however, the Court itself engages in
the BOP question by constructing those issues of controversy as a matter of law.
In Dominican Cigarette, the tax code of the Dominican Republic required that
stamps be affixed on all cigarette packets in its territory. Although the tax stamp
requirement applied to both domestic and foreign cigarettes, foreign cigarette producers
decried the requirement as discriminatory since stamps had to be affixed on the imported
cigarette packets in the Dominican warehouses in the presence of Dominican tax
inspectors, instead of being affixed in the exporting countries beforehand.146
The Dominican Republic justified the tax stamp requirement under GATT
Article XX (d), claiming that it was “necessary” to prevent tax evasion and cigarette
smuggling.147 In the same line with Hormones and Asbestos, the Dominican Republic
argued that it has “no reasonable alternatives” to achieve its desired level of enforcement,
which it has the right to determine.148 Both the case law and international practices on
this subject seem to support the Dominican position. The panel in Argentina – Hides and
Leather certainly recognized that prevention techniques, such as tax stamps, could address
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tax evasion.149 The International Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trade (ICITT) has also
identified tax stamps as a legitimate tool to deter distribution of illegal imports.150
However, the panel viewed that a reasonable alternative, such as “providing
secure tax stamps to foreign exporters and affixing the stamps abroad, possibly under the
supervision of a reputable company that would conduct pre-shipment inspection and
certification,” was available, and thus held that the Dominican Republic had failed to
establish that the tax stamp requirement is justified under GATT Article XX(d).151 The
Dominican Republic appealed this ruling, highlighting that cigarette producers “actively
collaborate” to smuggle cigarettes and that alcoholic beverages are vastly smuggled when
allowing the affixation of tax stamps abroad.152
The AB upheld the panel’s ruling, yet did so in a rather astounding logic. The AB
blindly endorsed the panel’s second-guessing of the Dominican regulatory situation,
which departed from the previous jurisprudence in Hormones and Asbestos. The AB
simply categorized the panel’s view that the tax stamp requirement was “of limited
effectiveness” as “findings of fact” and deferred this issue to the panel under DSU Article
11.153 In other words, the AB unconditionally accepted the panel’s findings on such issues
as “limited effectiveness of the tax stamp requirement in preventing forgery, smuggling
and tax evasion; greater effectiveness and efficiency of measures such as security features
incorporated into the tax stamps or police controls.”154
However, the panel’s findings concern more of the standard of review or deference,
rather than of factual findings. Although these findings do involve certain facts, a more
fundamental question is whether the panel, not the Dominican Republic itself, should
render a definite prescription on this regulatory problem. In Hormones and Asbestos, the
AB upheld the right to regulate as well as the principle of in dubio mitius, thereby never
second-guessing the zero-tolerance policy. While this deferential interpretation, or the
liberal standard of proof, certainly involves an issue of law, the AB in this case labeled it
as an issue of fact and thus escaped its burden.
Under the AB’s logic, it should have also accepted the panel’s findings in
Gambling as factual findings. In Gambling, the panel concluded that the U.S.’ ban on
cross-border gambling was not a necessary measure since the U.S. could have pursued a
reasonably available alternative, i.e., “engaging in consultations with Antigua, with a view
to arriving at a negotiated settlement that achieves the same objectives as the challenged
149
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United States' measures.”155 Yet, the AB rejected the panel’s finding as flawed in that the
panel’s solution was not a reasonable alternative because “consultations are by definition
a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable of comparison with
the measures at issue in this case.”156
The incoherency between Dominican Cigarette and Gambling is prominent. The
AB characterized the panel’s “necessity” analysis under GATT Article XX as a matter of
fact in the former case, while it constructed the same analysis as a matter of law in the
latter case. Therefore, in the former case the panel’s conclusion on whether (and what) to
prove was upheld, while in the latter case the same conclusion was rejected.
In sum, if the AB agrees with the panel’s findings on critical issues, the AB will
elect not to intervene in the panel’s findings on the ground that “the Panel's
consideration and weighing of the evidence. . . relates to its assessment of the facts and,
therefore, falls outside the scope of appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.”157
However, if the AB disagrees with the panel’s interpretation even on facts, the AB will
interfere with it by converting these originally factual issues into legal ones. This
incoherent exercise of the Court’s hermeneutical burden tends to undermine the
credibility of WTO jurisprudence in general.
B. Finality over Legitimacy: Legitimacy Crisis

1. Judicialization as Finality
In addition to creating jurisprudential incoherency and its consequent confusion,
the Court’s judicialization of science and/or regulatory second-guessing through the BOP
risks undermining the Court’s legitimacy as a fair arbiter. Judicialization means finality
since the Court’s final ruling, once adopted, becomes the law in a given dispute: the case
is closed for all. The Court might want to justify this finality through science or any other
form of rationality. To the Court, science is a universal language through which the Court
could authoritatively utter an ultimate substantive decision. As Hercules, the Court
would always be capable of rendering a right answer for each dispute.
However, any specific version of science or other form of rationality which the
Court picks for its own use may be just one out of many paradigms or perspectives.158
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Critically, this peculiar way of understanding and interpreting science leads the Court to
disregard certain responses from parties and attach importance to one kind of response
over others.159 It is at this juncture that the Court’s judicialization of science becomes
“political,” not scientific (objective). Under these circumstances, the Court’s exercise of
its hermeneutical burden over the BOP tends to erode its legitimacy by inviting more, not
less, politics from the parties concerned.
Since the Court is not a political organ, such politicization would not be tolerated
at least by a losing party which might resent the fact that it has lost its case due to
political, not scientific (objective), reasons. If the losing party is an importer (regulating
country), it would feel deprived of its regulatory autonomy, and even sovereignty. If the
losing party is an exporter, it would feel frustrated over its stymied market access. Either
such regulatory failure (under-regulation) or trade failure (over-regulation) would
generate resentment of the losing party towards the Court, thereby eroding the Court’s
compliance pull, i.e., legitimacy.160
2. Over-Regulative Finality: Science under Politics
The Court’s judicialization of science, and subsequently politicization of science,
tends to make the Court more comfortable in departing from conventional scientific
positions represented by widely accepted international standards and practices. In doing
so, the Court not only blends science and politics but also marginalizes conventional
science for the sake of politics.
At first glance, faced with tons of documents from both parties which only
advocate their own versions (paradigms) of science as well as lengthy expert opinions, the
Court’s task seems to be that of a “Science Court” which determines “both the meaning
and the merits of the risk assessment documents” as well as “the truth of various scientific
propositions.”161 It might purport to deliver a scientifically correct, and thus legitimate,
answer.162
However, a WTO version of Science Court is fatally prone to politically motivated
over-regulation and the consequent restraint of trade not only because WTO panelists
and AB members are non-experts in these scientific matters but also because science can
only be judicialized in a transcendental, which is basically political, fashion.163
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For example, the AB in Hormones reversed the panel’s ruling that a regulating
party (EC), when its measure, i.e. a total ban, departed from the Codex standard on the
residual hormone levels, should bear the burden of proving that the ban was nonetheless
scientifically justified. The AB, driven by a politically charged assumption of members’
regulatory prerogative, ruled that it is the complaining party (United States) which should
prove that the ban was not scientifically justified. In doing so, the AB downgraded the
significance of SPS-endorsed international standards, such as the Codex standard, despite
the Agreement being seriously committed to those standards as a vehicle for
harmonization.164
However, international standards, at least those that are explicitly recognized in
the SPS Agreement, such as the Codex standard, are a reification of WTO Members’
sovereignty-checking commitments to achieve a communal goal of harmonization. The
AB’s reversal of the BOP risks undoing these initial commitments and sending a false
signal that a regulating country is free to disregard international standards whenever it
finds them inconvenient.165 As a result, the AB’s BOP hermeneutics on international
standards may result in the serious underuse of these standards, thereby undermining
their legitimacy. Moreover, members’ indifference and lack of inputs to international
standards would also deter these standards from being further developed and improved,
which is evidently inconsistent with what the SPS Agreement envisions.166
Furthermore, in Hormones, the AB dismissed a legitimate distinction between risk
assessment (science) and risk management (politics), which has widely been accepted in
scientists’ circles,167 purely on a narrow textual ground.168 As a result, the AB shrunk an
practice “leaves too much discretion to non-expert, non-specialized panellists to judge issues of tremendous
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independent space for conventional science under the SPS. The conventional science in
this case was at odds with the ban as it dismissed the necessity of regulatory
differentiation between naturally occurring hormones and artificially injected hormones
despite their different pathways.169 The Hormone panel attempted to preserve the integrity
of this critical scientific finding by distinguishing risk assessment (an “examination of data
and studies”)170 from risk management (a “policy exercise involving social value
judgments made by political bodies”).171 Yet, the AB dramatically undermined the rigor of
a risk assessment requirement, and thus science itself, by electing a very loose
construction of risk assessment permitting the consideration of non-empirical, nonexperimental factors, which could encompass even non-scientific considerations, such as
fears and human biases.172
Critically, widely accepted scientific practices, which are the outcome of hitherto
scientific deliberation and discourse, should not be discarded lightly. The AB’s rather
dogmatic stance like the one in Hormones may suffocate further discourse, and be abused
to cater to pseudo-science and/or protectionism. Even politicians should heed what
scientists have found: politicians should not manipulate science in a way which serves
their political needs.
If we maintain a distinction between risk assessment (science) and risk
management (politics), we may at least locate a logical sequence between these two stages.
In other words, risk assessment should come before risk management, not vice versa.
Without a scientific investigation in the first place, the determination of an appropriate
level of protection could not be obtained. Yet, in Hormones the AB ignored this sequence
and in effect mingled risk assessment and risk management.
The AB did recognize that the EC failed to comply with Article 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement since the EC conducted no assessment on risk caused by any abusive use of
hormones and the administrative difficulties in control of the hormones for growth
promotion purposes.173 The EC therefore failed to provide any scientific assessment on the
administrative risk (controlled use) vis-à-vis the zero-tolerance policy. This failure should
have generated a presumption that the EC’s determination of its level of protection would
not be appropriate. After all, how could the EC confidently choose the zero-tolerance
level of protection, which would deny the possibilities of controlled use or administration
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with good practice, without any scientific investigation on such an exorbitant option in
the first place?
Therefore, under the AB’s approach, the EC might ex post justify its predetermined strict regulatory position, shaped purely by political considerations, by
locating, or even creating, favorable scientific studies. This sorry state of science under
politics tends to advocate over-regulation at the expense of legitimate trade interests.
3. Under-Regulative Finality: Regulatory Autonomy Lost
The Court’s Herculean hermeneutics over the BOP also tends to “second-guess”
the regulating countries’ legitimate policies. This is yet another judicialization of science
in that the Court itself assesses all the risks and effectiveness of possible policy options
through its own reasoning to deliver a substantive finality to a given dispute. Such finality
may be labeled as political in that the Court’s own reasoning may not always be shared by
parties, in particular the losing party. The Court’s second-guessing under GATT Article
XX is conducted via the titular ‘weighing and balancing test” invented in Korean Beef.
Under the test, the AB launched a highly intrusive judicial review in which it assessed
both the means and ends of a domestic regulation in question.174
As discussed above,175 this test represents a serious incoherency in the Court’s
hermeneutics as it blatantly departs from its in dubio mitius standard established in
Hormones. The basic assumption of the test is flawed since it presupposes Hercules who
would know better than local regulators all the necessary details, such as the actual level
of protection or what would have been necessary to achieve a certain legitimate policy
objective in a given situation. Under the test, it would be very difficult for a defending
(regulating) party to discharge its burden of proving that its measure was necessary to
achieve its own level of protection before a seemingly omniscient, and commandeering,
Court.
Another concern related to the weighing and balancing test centres on the NorthSouth tension. In most cases, developing countries’ regulatory challenges as well as their
regulatory solutions are unique and hard to generalize. Options available to developed
countries may not be feasible to them mainly due to the lack of resources and capacity. If
these circumstances are not fully taken into account under the weighing and balancing
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process, an adjudicatory outcome might be out of sync with the reality, and thus both
offensive and ineffective, and therefore illegitimate.
This is precisely why the Thai Cigarette panel under the old GATT dispute
settlement mechanism was criticized so harshly. Despite the World Health Organization
(WHO)’s support for the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes to protect public health in
developing countries, the GATT panel struck it down on the ground that Thailand failed
to prove that its ban was the least trade restrictive. The panel viewed that Thailand could
have found other alternatives, which were highly hypothetical and might have only been
effective to rich countries. This northern bias can also be found in a more recent case. In
Dominican Cigarettes,176 the AB struck down a Dominican tax stamp requirement simply
because the Court was not persuaded by the Dominican Republic’s regulatory decision
and thus held that the Dominican Republic failed to prove the effectiveness of the tax
stamp requirement. In doing so, the AB failed to realize that for a developing country like
the Dominican Republic, the AB’s own alternatives, such as conventional enforcement
measures, would not work in achieving the level of protection which the Dominican
Republic desired to pursue with its limited budget and staff.
The Court’s lack of regulatory deference to developing countries,, when
juxtaposed with a diametrically opposite position in other cases involving developed
countries, tends to arouse a suspicion on the Court’s legal realism, i.e., its bias against less
powerful WTO members. In Hormones, Asbestos and Gambling, which involved politically
powerful developed countries, such as the EC and the Unites States, the Court seemed to
be quite deferential to local regulators who stuck to a highly conservative regulatory
position, such as a zero-tolerance policy.177 Yet, in other cases, such as Salmon, Dominican
Cigarette and Korean Beef, which involved politically less powerful members, such as
Australia, Dominican Republic and Korea, the Court seemed to feel more comfortable in
second-guessing local regulators’ decisions and presenting its own prescriptions. Therefore,
legal realists might contend that the Court instrumentalizes the BOP as a “tool to support
result-oriented findings.”178
4. Finality without Compliance Pull: Legitimacy at Risk
The WTO is not a World Government nor does it have a well-developed
legislative mechanism as seen in other institutions, such as the European Union.
Moreover, socio-cultural foundations for risks and regulation vary among different
members. This lack of both positivistic infrastructure and common moral foundations
among members tends to disenable the WTO tribunal from producing truly legitimate
176
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answers to controversial regulatory disputes involving health risks and regulatory
responses. In other words, with little shared regulatory ethos, i.e., shared assumptions on
regulatory decision-making, as well as administrative and political efforts to build up such
ethos via mutually recognized and trusted institutions, any substantive closure on highly
combustible issues, such as regulations over beef hormones or genetically modified foods,
by an unelected international tribunal lacks a base for legitimization, and thus appears as
imprudent judicial activism.179
Even if the Court attempts to close a case by rendering a final, substantive answer
to a dispute, the losing party can re-open the case merely by window-dressing violative
measures, instead of truly implementing the answer. Then, the winning party will have to
re-commence a new litigation in an attempt to re-close the original dispute. The World
Trade Court’s incapability to close a dispute is not merely attributable to parties’ insincere
implementation of its original decision. In many cases, especially those involving
controversial and complicated public health policies, the Court’s final decision might not
be final, or at least might not be regarded final by the losing party, for a number of reasons.
First of all, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to digest all
the sophisticated, technical scientific evidence and evaluate them to produce a final
answer. Second, as discussed above,180 the Court’s interpretation of science in a specific
context may diverge from that of members. Under these circumstances, if the Court’s
ruling is based on its own substantive processing of all the scientific evidence, such a
ruling might be hard for the losing party to accept. Third, since more often than not the
Court’s decision addresses only limited, specific provision-based issues, such decisions
could not fully address the root of an underlying dispute over a certain regulatory
policy.181 Under these circumstances, as Richard Gaskin aptly observed, the Court might
broaden the existing divisions between the litigants, rather than settling their dispute.182
Therefore, the Court encroaches upon its legitimacy as a neutral adjudicative
organ when it renders substantive justice based on its own weighing and balancing over
highly controversial and sophisticated issues such as health risks.183 Both parties and
observers might translate the Court’s decision as its own subjective value, or even moral
statement on these political subjects, instead of a case-specific ruling on certain narrow
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legal issues.184 It is likely that parties and observers view that the Court itself is right or
wrong, rather than noting that a specific decision which it renders may be right or wrong.
Concededly, all disputes may potentially be political cases. Nonetheless, these
issues are not traditional trade issues such as tariffs and discrimination in which the Court
tends to enjoy a certain aura of legitimacy both from its time-honored jurisprudence on
these issues and from the relatively clear-cut nature of the cases. Yet, certain regulatory
issues are still in their adolescence both inside and outside the WTO. Countries have yet
to develop a common language over widely shared premises in tackling these troublesome
issues. Without these common grounds, a losing party will be reluctant to accept any
balancing test exercised by the Court sharing with it none of such regulatory ethos. This
legitimacy risk tends to become more salient when the losing party is a poor country to
which any high regulatory standards might be potential trade barriers impeding and
hindering their market access to rich countries.
Finally, cognitive psychology casts dark clouds over final rulings rendered by
Herculean judges. Obviously, both panelists and the Appellate Body members are neither
Hercules nor any other superhuman. They are just humans, like everyone else, prone to
errors and biases, especially “cognitive” ones. When they process and interpret critical
scientific evidence presented by parties, they may adopt their own perspectives, or
heuristics, which selectively filter certain evidentiary objects, such as scientific reports or
expert opinions, and thus influence their probative determinations.185 This “cognitive
filtering”186 tends to question the very rationale of the normative possibility of “objective
assessment” under Article 11 of the DSU.
This cognitive bias may be further maintained or reinforced by “political”
considerations of panelists or the Appellate Body members over their decisions. As long
as their appointment, and even selection, remains “political rather” than meritorious, they
are keen to political ramifications of their decisions. From a legal realist’s perspective,
they may choose who should win even before they hear the case solely in accordance with
what and who are involved. They may also be tempted to blend adequate nuances and
subtleties, often in the form of dicta, with their decisions, paying certain face-making
tributes to losers.

V. Discharging the World Trade Court’s Burden: A Procedural Turn
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A. A Copernican Turn: Legitimacy over Finality
The Court, in adjudicating those WTO disputes involving risk regulations and
other similar social regulations, has determined who to prove, what to prove and whether
to prove from the standpoint of Herculean judges which render definite right
(substantive) answers with its transcendental authority. This judicialization of science
tends to discount scientific uncertainty as well as unique local regulatory context, thereby
making losing parties resist accepting final decisions. That is, adjudication in the WTO is
not likely to close risk-related disputes, and parties would continue to claim substantive
authority on its own position to dismiss the other party’s case. Losing parties would be
tempted to window dress the Court’s decision and eager to find circumventive measures
to stand by its original position.187 Ironically, judicialization of science tends to drive
parties to cling to the “transcendental critiques” which trivialize the very objective
authority of science.188
At this juncture, one might be tempted to overcome this substantive dilemma by
perfecting the Court’s technical criteria, such as streamlining the standards of proof in the
line of “preponderance of evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”189 or bestowing a
higher degree of deference to one party, such as a regulating party.190 However, this
attempt to articulate the standard of proof seems to make no practical differences as long
as the Court’s standard of review remains substantive. After all, whether the Court is
convinced or not hinges on its free evaluation of evidence and arguments adduced by
parties.
If the Court cannot overcome the aforementioned substantive dilemma, it must
avoid the dilemma. Instead of closing indefinite cases by prescribing definite answers, the
Court should encourage parties to continue talking, deliberating and cooperating with
each other until they reach a mutually acceptable regulatory solution. To achieve this,
the Court may unearth procedural elements, such as reason-giving, embedded in major
provisions, and determine the BOP questions (who to prove, what to prove and whether
to prove) for these provisions in accordance with parties’ performance of those procedural
disciplines.191
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One might argue that the Court should accord a regulating country an absolute
deference in risk determination. As Cass Sunstein, Richard Pildes, and Kip Viscusi
observe, any risks can be characterized by their “contextual” circumstances and thus
proved to be sui generis. For example, people tend to perceive uncontrollable, artificial,
and involuntarily imposed risks more seriously than other controllable, natural, and
voluntarily accepted risks, even though the probability that these two different risks may
materialize are actually identical.192 In this situation, democratic rationality may entail a
conservative regulatory posture, even if it proves to be unscientific in a technical sense,
and SPS would not find such conservatism as arbitrary or unjustifiable.
However, this position overlooks the dynamic nature of people’s perception of
risks. People’s original perceptions of risks are prone to change by means of further
education. Thus, any given perception cannot but be provisional and subject to future
alteration. This is why even deference to a regulating country in the line of in dubio mitius
should always be accompanied by certain procedural disciplines which not only prevent
any abuse of such deference but also keep the door of enlightenment open. The Court
can effectively oversee any abuse of deference by scrutinizing the regulating country’s
adherence to procedural duties explicit and implicit under the SPS Agreement. If the
regulating country respects these duties in setting its own level of protection, and yet such
measure still restrains trade, this restraint must be tolerated.193
B. Discharging the Court’s Burden: Reinterpreting WTO Provisions on Risk Regulation

1. Necessity Test (GATT Article XX)
The Court’s “weighing and balancing test” may impose a high probative threshold
on a defending (regulating) country, requiring it to prove that the measure in question
was the least trade restrictive and thus there were no other reasonably available
alternatives. Because it is the Court that actually weighs and balances those actual and
hypothetical policy options, the outcome of such weighing and balancing may be quite
detached from the local reality. This second-guessing of risks becomes unhealthy judicial
activism, which goes beyond the Court’s mandate as an arbiter, not a legislator. It also
self-contradicts another interpretive stance in similar (risk-related) issues represented by
in dubio mitius. All these problems tend to eventually undermine the Court’s legitimacy.
In fact, this test is a digression from the Court’s previous laudable hermeneutics
labeled the “chapeau test.” In earlier GATT Article XX cases, such as Gasoline and
Shrimp-Turtle, the Court took the local regulatory autonomy seriously and deferred the
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issue of whether the regulation was a legitimate exercise of its policy objective to a
regulating country.194 Instead, it focused on the procedural aspects of the regulation, i.e.,
whether the measure was applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner stipulated in the
introductory language of Article XX (chapeau). The Court breathed new life into this
quite mundane language, which had been nearly dead letters before, and created a new
procedural hermeneutics of regulatory cooperation and due process. Under the chapeau
of Article XX regulating countries have to prove that they do take into account the
interests of exporting countries which might be negatively affected by the former’s
regulation,195 and that the regulation respected the due process principle in their legal
system.196
The chapeau test is a mature balance-striker between free trade values and
regulatory autonomy (non-trade values) in that it highlights “how” a measure is applied,
rather than “what” the measure really is. The Court should further develop this line of
jurisprudence, rather than weighing and balancing regulatory details on its own discretion.
If a regulating party demonstrates that it seriously engaged with negatively affected
countries, such as exporting countries, through consultation and negotiation, the Court
should decide that the regulating party has discharged its BOP under GATT Article XX,
even if this engagement bore no substantial outcome.197 On the other hand, if the
evidence showed that the regulating party refused to work with the exporting countries or
responded to their inquiries in a dismissive manner, the Court should rule that the
regulating party has not met its BOP under Article XX.
In sum, the restoration of the chapeau test will encourage parties to engage in
more regulatory dialogue and cooperation because this is what they should prove under
GATT Article XX. Thus, this test envisions a “good and responsible government” which
takes into account its trading partners’ interests in the era of interdependence and
globalization.198
2. Harmonization (SPS Article 3)
In Hormones, the Court recognized the defending (regulating) parties’ right to
depart from international standards and thus required complaining parties to prove that
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such departure would lack scientific justification.199 However, this interpretation
weakened the normative prominence of international standards by constructing the
compliance with these standards as a mere option, not as an obligation, despite the
explicit language under SPS Article 3.1 which requires members to base their sanitary
measures on these standards.
Under the SPS Agreement, the Codex standards explicitly referenced in Annex A
are a reincarnation of science.200 These standards embody views of an epistemic
community in a given sector as well as its professional accountability.201 They are a
representative repository of scientific evidence, and therefore should not be taken lightly.
Both the preamble and Article 3 attest that harmonization via international standards is
one of the main objects and purposes of the SPS Agreement.202
Therefore, the Court should take international standards more seriously. From
this standpoint, Article 3.1 tends to create a procedural obligation to seriously engage in
international standards, i.e., a good faith effort to adopt international standards. The
Court should guide parties to focus on this procedural aspect in discharging their proof
burdens as to Article 3.1-3.3. In particular, the Court should interpret that Articles 3.4
and 5.8 inform Article 3.1-3.3. Article 3.4 requires members to engage in serious
regulatory dialogue over international standards,203 and Article 5.8 mandates a regulating
member departing international standards to respond to an exporting member’s
inquiries.204
Granted, international standards may not satisfy all the members. Yet, a regulating
member departing from these standards may at least present its different views in a
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relevant forum, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, to persuade other members
to modify these standards, if it truly means to respect the Article 3.4 requirement. Likewise,
the regulating member should also fulfill the reason-giving requirement under Article 5.8.
The Court should demand parties, whichever bear the BOP, to prove these aspects. If a
regulating party forsakes international standards without performing these procedural
obligations, it would be sufficient to create a presumption against scientific justification
since under these circumstances the measure could be presumed to be a unilateral
regulatory determination with no involvement with the scientific community.
3. Risk Assessment (SPS Article 5.1)
The Court should interpret that the reason-giving requirement under Article 5.8
also informs Article 5.1. If a respondent fails to engage with a requesting country, this is
tantamount to admitting that the requesting country, i.e., the potential complainant, has
made a prima facie case since such failure generates a reasonable presumption that the
respondent’s SPS measure was adopted without reasons which connote scientific
justification.205
Likewise, the Court may link procedural disciplines under Article 7
(Transparency) as well as Annex B (Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Regulations) to the risk assessment requirement under Article 5.1. For example, if a
complainant has requested to a defendant “the products to be covered by the regulation
together with a brief indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed regulation”206
but received no genuine responses, it could generate a presumption against the regulating
Member (defendant)’s fulfillment of the risk assessment obligation. In other words, if the
defendant has failed to present a proper justification for its SPS measure, one might raise
a reasonable suspicion that such measure was adopted without necessary disciplines, such
as risk assessment based on scientific evidence. Under these circumstances, an initial BOP
borne to the complainant may be shifted to the defendant, which should now prove that
it nonetheless performed risk assessment. Procedural flaws, such as the lack of due process
or reason-giving, are often suggestive of substantive deficiencies, such as the lack of a
substantial relationship between an alleged internal assessment and an adopted SPS
measure.
Suppose the regulating state (defendant) does respond to the inquiring state
(complainant) with certain reasons and justification. If the inquiring state is satisfied with
205

“The United States could have requested Japan, pursuant to Article 5.8 of SPS Agreement, to
provide "an explanation of the reasons" for its varietal testing requirement, in particular, as it applies to
apricots, pears, plums and quince. Japan would, in that case, be obliged to provide such explanation. The
failure of Japan to bring forward scientific studies or reports in support of its varietal testing requirement as
it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince, would have been a strong indication that there are no such
studies or reports.” Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶137,
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
206
SPS, supra note_, annex B, ¶5(b).

46

As of March 7, 2007

such reason-giving, no further inquiry will follow, hence no dispute. If the inquiring state,
still unsatisfied, raises further questions on scientific justification of the measure, the
regulating state should also respond to these additional inquiries in good faith. This series
of a question and answer process is likely to constitute a meaningful regulatory dialogue
between the regulating and inquiring state. This regulatory dialogue tends to contribute
to mitigating, if not eradicating, tensions which stem largely from ignorance and
misinformation. This dialectical exchange of reason-demanding and reason-giving by
parties concerned is a prerequisite for any regulatory cooperation since such dialogue
creates certain room for each party to take into account the other’s interests and concerns.
Even if such dialogue cannot entail regulatory cooperation and litigation finally ensues,
the Court may use parties’ arguments and submissions as undisputed facts or at least
circumstantial evidence which may assist the Court to discharge its own burden on the
BOP.207
4. Risk Management (SPS Article 5.5)
In determining the appropriate level of protection under Article 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement, a regulating party must satisfy many requirements, such as minimizing any
restrictive impact to trade and avoiding any arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction.208 In
fact, these requirements can be translated into certain procedural duties. To minimize
trade restriction under Article 5.4, a regulating party should reach out to its trading
partners which may be affected by its regulation, such as exporting countries. In other
words, this obligation tends to impose on the regulating state a certain procedural duty to
cooperate with these exporting countries in consulting and negotiating over possible
arrangements which can achieve both goals of regulatory protection and free trade.
Likewise, to avoid any arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction in determining the
appropriate level of protection under Article 5.5, the regulating country should
investigate and re-investigate whether its SPS measure has been consistent with its
hitherto regulatory practice in similar issues and whether it may generate other due
process concerns. Naturally, the Court’s final decision on whether a regulating country
has violated those SPS provisions may depend on whether the country has discharged its
burden of proving that it has genuinely adhered to those procedural disciplines.
According to this approach, the AB in Hormones should have interpreted that the
EC should prove that it had adequately communicated with other affected parties, e.g.,
the United States, before it reached the conclusion that artificially-injected hormones
were riskier than naturally-occurring hormones. It should not have unconditionally
declared that such distinction is “fundamental” and any comparison between these two

207

The Court, as in Hormones, may use them as warning signals or additional factors which help
the Court discharge its hermeneutical burdens.
208
SPS, supra note_, art. 5.5.

47

As of March 7, 2007

regulatory situations is preposterous.209 Admittedly, the AB would still have found the
EC’s total ban on hormoned beef to be legal under the SPS Agreement, yet for a different
reason from the original one, i.e., a procedural, not substantive, reason.

Conclusion
The current way of discharging the Court’s burden of determining the BOP issues,
such as who to prove, what to prove and whether to prove, risks illegitimating the Court
by rendering transcendental answers in combustible risk-related disputes to parties which
have already been entrenched with their own transcendental answers. As a solution, the
Court should focus on procedural aspects of WTO obligations in this area so that it can
encourage parties to seriously commit themselves to regulatory dialogue and cooperation.
This rethinking of the Court’s role is not radical one if one acknowledges that the
Court’s institutional responsibility is closer to a constitutional court than to a mundane
civil court. The purpose of the Court lies not only in simply resolving disputes by picking
the winner but also in constituting a legal (regulatory) community within the WTO system.
While the Court’s hitherto incoherency in the BOP jurisprudence has exacerbated an
adversarial struggle of parties and led to ever-lengthening reports, it has certainly failed to
nurture a regularized pattern of regulatory discourse among parties concerned. After all, a
real closure on any sensitive regulatory dispute with socio-cultural characteristics
originates from parties themselves, not from the Court.
The proceduralized hermeneutics proposed here tends to provide both parties with
adequate incentives to facilitate regulatory dialogue and regulatory cooperation. An
exporting country would like to proactively inquire of an importing country’s SPS
measure with challenging scientific information which would help the former establish its
prima facie case on risk assessment. Even if the importing country had eventually rejected
the information, it would still have to register, for the record, other information
counteracting the exporting country’s original information. This would in turn trigger yet
another round of inquiries or regulatory dialogue. As their dialogue deepens, so becomes
their level of mutual understanding. The exporting country might be persuaded by the
importing country’s reason-giving and forsake the idea of a WTO litigation. Or, both
parties might have reached a certain regulatory arrangement to resolve their disputes. In
sum, this culture of proceduralism will eventually prevent disputes, rather than settle them.
Notably, this strategy of legitimacy over closure seems prudent especially when a
fact-finding mission of the Court is severely challenged by scientific uncertainty and
disagreement on risks involved. As Lawrence Solum contends, BOP under these
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circumstances should be allocated to achieve certain purposes, such as fairness.210 The
Court’s hermeneutical refocusing on procedural disciplines not only enhances the
legitimacy of its decision but also helps parties reach mutually acceptable regulatory
settlement through continuing regulatory cooperation, which those procedural disciplines
tend to provide. This procedural approach will also shelter the WTO from potential
criticisms from interest groups, such as environmentalists and consumer advocates, since
the Court could refrain from rendering any substantive answers.211
In conclusion, the Court’s new hermeneutics proposed here212 will help parties
change their way of engaging with each other in the global trading community.
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